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Response 
Truthiness: Corporate Public Figures and 
the Problem of Harmful Truths 
Ashutosh Bhagwat† 
This paper is an invited response to Deven Desai’s excel-
lent article, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate 
Public Figure Doctrine.1 Desai argues that modern law has cre-
ated an asymmetry in the treatment of corporations. The 
source of the problem, Desai argues, is that cases like Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission2 provide robust protec-
tion for corporate speech. At the same time, however, trade-
mark law and (to a lesser extent) the commercial speech doc-
trine permit corporations to silence the speech of others 
criticizing them. The result is an uneven playing field, where 
corporations have robust rights to strengthen their reputations, 
while critics are hamstrung. The solution Desai proposes is a 
“corporate public figure doctrine,” under which nationally 
known corporations should be treated as general-purpose pub-
lic figures, while smaller, local corporations will often be lim-
ited-purpose public figures. This means that, pursuant to the 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan,3 in order to bring legal claims for infringement or di-
lution of their trademarks, corporations must prove falsehood 
 
Professor Bhagwat’s response piece was scheduled for publication in Vol-
ume 98, Issue 3. Due to an editorial oversight, the piece did not go to print on 
schedule. It is therefore with sincere apologies to Professor Bhagwat that we 
now publish his response to Devan Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A 
Corporate Public Figure Doctrine, 98 MINN. L. REV. 455 (2013). 
 
 With apologies to Stephen Colbert. 
†  Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. B.A. 1986 Yale University, 
J.D. 1990 the University of Chicago. Thanks to Deven Desai and Peter Lee for 
extremely helpful comments. Copyright © 2014 by Ashutosh Bhagwat. 
 1. Deven R. Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public 
Figure Doctrine, 98 MINN. L. REV. 455 (2013).  
 2. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 3. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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and “actual malice,” meaning knowledge or reckless disregard 
of the truth. This, Desai concludes, will provide the robust pro-
tection for speech criticizing corporations that the First 
Amendment demands. 
Desai’s argument is clever, and in many ways quite con-
vincing. I have no doubt he is correct regarding the existence of 
the asymmetry he identifies. He is also quite convincing in ar-
guing that under modern circumstances, much corporate 
speech, including speech about corporations’ own products, is in 
effect political speech given the politicization of issues such as 
work conditions, geographic origin of goods, etc. However, I 
have two hesitations. First, I wonder about the extent to which 
trademark law really does inhibit criticism of corporations, giv-
en the broad exceptions in the Lanham Act for speech such as 
fair use, parody, and noncommercial uses.4 Second, and more 
fundamentally, I have doubts that the public figure doctrine 
and actual malice standard are necessarily the best solutions to 
the problem Desai cogently describes. New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan was a case about libel, where factual truth was central 
to the dispute. Trademark law, however—in particular, trade-
mark dilution law, on which Desai correctly focuses—is not 
necessarily concerned with truth. It advances different inter-
ests. Actual malice, therefore, might be off the mark here. In-
stead, a more direct examination of how the goals of trademark 
law arguably clash with First Amendment values is needed. 
I. DESAI AND THE CORPORATE PUBLIC FIGURE 
DOCTRINE 
Deven Desai’s basic argument in Speech, Citizenry, and the 
Market is simple and elegant. He begins by making two im-
portant, interrelated points about corporate speech in the mod-
ern era. First, under Citizens United, corporations appear to 
enjoy all of the speech rights of individuals.5 Second, much of 
what corporations say is of profound public importance and po-
litical valence.6 This is true not only when corporations speak 
in an explicitly political mode, as did Citizens United, but also 
when corporations speak about their own products and activi-
ties. In modern times, issues like labor conditions at corporate 
suppliers, the geographic origins of goods, the labor practices of 
 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012). 
 5. Desai, supra note 1, at 459–62. 
 6. Id. at 462–74. 
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corporations (e.g., whether the corporation grants benefits to 
same-sex partners), and how corporations interact with foreign, 
often totalitarian, governments (think Google and Yahoo in 
China) are all profoundly political issues. Yet ultimately, these 
are issues about a corporation’s products and internal business 
practices, topics that traditionally would have been considered 
“commercial” rather than political. Combine these two insights 
and a clear conclusion emerges: corporations are tremendously 
important, powerful, political speakers in our society, and their 
political speech (now understood to include much advertising) 
is ubiquitous. Desai makes the further, intriguing point that in 
today’s world of highly politicized commerce and brands, con-
sumption can be understood as a form of voting, and so speech 
about consumption can be understood as speech about political 
choices.7 Finally, Desai argues that given corporations’ active, 
voluntary engagement in public debate and affairs, many if not 
most significant corporations would qualify as either general-
purpose or limited-purpose public figures under the Court’s ex-
tant First Amendment jurisprudence.8 All of this is very inter-
esting, and in my view quite convincing. 
The second part of Desai’s article focuses on trademark law 
and its treatment of corporate “face” or reputation.9 He begins 
by making the important point that given the role of corporate 
“brand” in the public world, corporations are understood in our 
society to have distinct identities, and often identities with a 
political aspect to them.10 Furthermore, these public identities 
are closely linked with corporate trademarks.11 Again, this 
seems clearly correct—surely we all understand the cultural 
differences between, say, Walmart and Google. This means that 
corporations have reputations, which they seek to preserve. As 
examples, Desai discusses two (ultimately unsuccessful) cases 
brought by Mattel against a musical group and an artist, be-
cause of their depictions of Mattel’s Barbie doll in unflattering 
ways.12 The problem, Desai points out, is that there is a deep 
tension between the assumptions of trademark law, upon 
 
 7. Id. at 471–72. 
 8. Id. at 468–69 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344–
45, 351 (1974)). 
 9. Id. at 475–89. 
 10. Id. at 475–76.  
 11. Id. at 475–78. 
 12. Id. at 477 (discussing Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 
F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003), and Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 
(9th Cir. 2002)). 
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which corporate claims are often based, and First Amendment 
principles.13 For one thing, under the “likelihood of confusion” 
test, trademark law presumes that false or misleading uses of 
trademarks are unprotected; yet in the political sphere, the 
Court has extended substantial constitutional protection to 
even knowing falsehoods.14 Indeed, trademark law permits the 
condemnation of merely misleading speech, a result surely im-
permissible in the context of political speech (what would be 
left, after all?).15 Even more significantly, trademark dilution 
law explicitly protects corporate reputations, at least for “fa-
mous marks,” even absent proof of confusion or falsehood. Yet 
the presumption in the political arena is that public figures do 
not “own” their reputations. To the contrary, it is a fundamen-
tal assumption of First Amendment doctrine, explicitly stated 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, that public figures should 
be subject to criticism, even when it is “vehement, caustic, and 
sometime unpleasant[].”16 Finally, Desai points out that the 
very factors that make a particular corporation’s mark “fa-
mous” and so entitled to protection from dilution under federal 
law, also clearly point to the same corporation’s status as a 
general-purpose public figure.17 The contradiction now becomes 
clear: trademark law cites the very factors to justify protecting 
reputation that the First Amendment says justify harsh criti-
cism. Somehow this inconsistency must be resolved. 
The solution that Desai proposes to resolve the contradic-
tion is the corporate public figure doctrine.18 Such a rule would 
permit corporations that qualify as public figures—which 
would include most corporations that advertise and participate 
 
 13. See id. at 478–96 (explaining the incongruity and asymmetry in 
trademark and free-speech jurisprudence). 
 14. See id. at 481 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544–
55 (2012)) (noting limitations on speech deemed “commercial” compared to po-
litical speech). 
 15. Of course, at least as of now misleading commercial speech is not con-
stitutionally protected. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). However, reconciling trademark 
law and the First Amendment based on the distinction between commercial 
and non-commercial speech is a losing game, since as Desai nicely points out, 
this distinction is highly artificial, and rapidly collapsing. Desai, supra note 1, 
at 465–67, 470–74; see also Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 
(2011) (citing cases involving non-commercial speech in justifying “heightened 
judicial scrutiny” of a content-based regulation of commercial speech). 
 16. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268–70 (1964). 
 17. Desai, supra note 1, at 483. 
 18. Id. at 496–509. 
BHAGWAT_2fmt 11/7/2014 10:57 AM 
2014] TRUTHINESS 301 
 
in public debate—to bring trademark claims only if they can 
prove that the defendant’s speech was false, and that the de-
fendant acted with “actual malice” (i.e., with knowledge or 
reckless disregard of the truth).19 In other words, Desai would 
import wholesale the rules regarding libel established in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny into the trademark 
area.20 The result, he argues, would be increased speech and 
severe limitations on corporations’ ability to chill speech 
through lawsuits or threats, because actual malice is extremely 
difficult to prove.21 Using the examples of two successful trade-
mark suits that resulted in suppression of speech (one by Deere 
& Co., the other by Coca-Cola), Desai makes the argument that 
the cases would have turned out differently if the plaintiff cor-
porations had been forced to prove falsehood and actual malice, 
and furthermore, that the cases could have been resolved early 
in the litigation process, saving the defendants’ substantial de-
fense costs.22 This in turn would serve the First Amendment’s 
interest in advancing a robust, uninhibited public debate that 
is not centrally controlled by one entity—to wit, the corporation 
that is the subject of the debate.23 
II. MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING?24 PROBABLY NOT 
Desai’s is a stirring vision of a newly invigorated market-
place of ideas about corporations. Moreover, I have no doubt 
that Desai is correct to argue that there is a deep tension be-
tween trademark and First Amendment law.25 A question one 
might ask, however, is whether all of this is really all that im-
portant. After all, trademark law does not silence all, or even 
most, criticism of corporations; it only at most silences criti-
cisms that use the corporate trademark (or variations that 
cause confusion or dilution). Furthermore, the Lanham Act 
specifically exempts from dilution liability many uses of trade-
marks such as fair use (including parody and criticism), news 
 
 19. Id. at 497–99. 
 20. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (establishing the actual malice 
standard). 
 21. Desai, supra note 1, at 496–97. 
 22. Id. at 500–01 (discussing Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 
45 (2d Cir. 1994), and Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 
1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)). 
 23. Id. at 508–09. 
 24. With apologies to William Shakespeare. 
 25. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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reporting and commentary, and noncommercial uses,26 which 
one would expect to be the normal vehicles for critiques of cor-
porations. One might therefore ask whether, despite the ex-
cesses of trademark law, ample opportunities continue to exist 
to criticize corporations free of any possible trademark liability. 
Taking the second objection first, Desai acknowledges the 
Lanham Act exceptions, but ultimately finds them inadequate 
for two separate reasons: first, the exceptions do not cover 
state-law dilution claims, which are often joined to federal 
claims; and second, the exceptions are in any event too narrow 
and vague to provide comfort for would-be speakers.27 The first 
point about state-law claims is well-taken. However, there 
seems to me a powerful argument that even if state law does 
not explicitly recognize a fair-use exception to dilution claims, 
the First Amendment requires such an exception to be read in-
to these laws. After all, the Supreme Court has explicitly rec-
ognized in the copyright context that the fair use doctrine (in 
combination with the idea/expression dichotomy) provides a 
constitutionally essential accommodation of First Amendment 
values given the restrictions imposed by intellectual property 
law.28 There seems no reason why the same principle should not 
apply to trademark claims, including state-law claims, meaning 
that if states do not recognize such an exception, their trade-
mark rules should be found unconstitutional. 
Desai’s objection to the narrowness of the exceptions raises 
more difficult questions.29 On the one hand, in the copyright 
context the Supreme Court has found the fair use exception to 
be adequate protection for free speech.30 Admittedly, fair use in 
trademark law is narrower than fair use in copyright.31 Howev-
er, there seems little doubt that most explicitly political, schol-
arly, or journalistic criticisms of corporations would fit comfort-
ably within these exceptions. However, commercial uses of 
 
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012). 
 27. Desai, supra note 1, at 484. 
 28. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (explaining how 
copyright’s fair use defense is a “built-in First Amendment accommodation[]”); 
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 890 (2012) (reiterating that copyright law’s 
fair use doctrine embraces freedom of expression). 
 29. See Desai, supra note 1, at 484 (arguing that “the exemptions simply 
do not cover what they should”). 
 30. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 31. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 609–82, 785, 789 
(6th ed. 2012). 
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trademarks by a corporation’s competitors or others, in which 
criticism is driven by a user’s commercial motives, remain at 
risk. This is illustrated by three examples Desai provides. In 
one, a court enjoined Hyundai’s use of the Louis Vuitton 
trademark in a commercial designed to comment on the chang-
ing meaning of luxury (presumably to support Hyundai’s claim 
to new-found luxury status).32 In the second, a court prevented 
MTD Products, a lawn tractor manufacturer, from using an an-
imated version of the Deere logo (a deer) in a commercial where 
the deer is chased away by a dog and an MDT tractor.33 Finally, 
Desai cites an older case in which Coca-Cola successfully pre-
vented the sale of posters mimicking the Coca-Cola logo, but 
substituting “Cocaine” for “Coca-Cola.”34 The question, then, is 
whether restrictions on such commercial uses of trademarks, 
which combine criticisms of corporations with profit-making 
motives, should concern us from a First Amendment perspec-
tive. 
The answer, I think, is that they should, and that therefore 
Desai has indeed identified a serious problem. As for the fact 
that only criticisms using the corporate trademark are impact-
ed by the dilution claims, it must be remembered that the First 
Amendment protects not only the substance of critical speech, 
but also the form chosen by the speaker. This is the abiding 
lesson of the Supreme Court’s path-breaking decision in Cohen 
v. California, in which the Court upheld Paul Robert Cohen’s 
right, during the height of the Vietnam War, to walk the corri-
dors of the Los Angeles County Courthouse wearing a jacket 
with the words “Fuck the Draft” written on the back.35 Obvious-
ly, a prohibition on the public use of the word “fuck” would not 
silence all or most criticism of the Vietnam War. Nonetheless, 
the Court held Cohen’s speech protected because it concluded 
that the Constitution protected not only the right to convey 
specific messages, but also the manner in which those messag-
es are conveyed, including the “emotive function” of particular 
modes of expression.36 What is true of the use of the word “fuck” 
 
 32. Desai, supra note 1, at 484–85 (discussing Louis Vuitton Malletier, 
S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611 (PKC), 2012 WL 1022247 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012)). 
 33. Id. at 500–01 (discussing Deere & Co. v. MDT Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 
(2d Cir. 1994)). 
 34. Id. at 501 (discussing Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. 
Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)). 
 35. 403 U.S. 15, 16, 26. 
 36. Id. at 26. 
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is equally if not more true of the use of a corporate trademark: 
it provides a distinctly, perhaps uniquely, powerful way to con-
vey a message with emotional resonance. Just as “Down with 
the Draft” is not as effective a message as “Fuck the Draft,” a 
historical article revealing that Coca-Cola once contained co-
caine is surely a less effective way to convey that message than 
the suppressed poster discussed above.37 
The fact that the Lanham Act exempts news and noncom-
mercial uses of trademarks from dilution liability38 also pro-
vides less comfort than one might think. The reason, quite 
simply, is that the speakers who are most likely, in many in-
stances, to have the incentive and financial means to criticize a 
corporation are its economic competitors. Noncommercial 
groups almost by definition have fewer resources than commer-
cial entities, and are also less likely to seek out unflattering 
facts about a particular corporation unless they have some spe-
cific reason to do so. Commercial entities, on the other hand, 
always have incentives to denigrate their competitors, driven 
purely by the profit motive. Put differently, the Supreme 
Court’s insight in its foundational commercial-speech decision, 
Virginia Pharmacy, that commercial speech is more “durable” 
and “hard[y]” than noncommercial speech39 in this instance 
supports expanding rather than contracting First Amendment 
protections for such speech. 
Finally, I think that Desai is correct that the overarching 
“fair use” exemption from dilution liability is of less use to 
speakers than one might expect.40 The reason, quite simply, is 
that the definition of fair use is complex, unpredictable, and 
contested.41 As a result, speakers who are seeking to rely on the 
fair use exemption can rarely have confidence that a reviewing 
court will ultimately accept their invocation of that doctrine. 
Consider in this regard the MTD Products and Hyundai cases 
discussed above, in both of which a fair use defense or its state-
law equivalent was rejected.42 The result is that fear of liability 
 
 37. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012). 
 39. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). 
 40. Desai, supra note 1, at 484. 
 41. See Stephen B. Thau, Copyright, Privacy, and Fair Use, 24 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 179, 182 (1995) (noting that “fair use cases are unpredictable” and that 
“courts with similar factual cases often reach opposite conclusions while ap-
pearing to engage in identical analyses”). 
 42. Deere & Co. v. MDT Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 44–45 (2d Cir. 1994); 
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(especially strong given that these are generally commercial ac-
tors speaking) will inevitably lead to self-censorship and a 
chilling effect. 
In short, the use of trademark law to suppress criticisms 
of, and dialog about, corporations raises serious First Amend-
ment concerns, despite the limited range of the resulting sup-
pression. Moreover, in a world in which corporations are be-
coming dominant political speakers and actors, this tilting of 
speech is an assault on the most fundamental values underly-
ing the First Amendment. Some reining in of trademark dilu-
tion law in order to protect free speech and debate is therefore 
clearly called for. The question to which we now turn is wheth-
er the corporate public figure doctrine is (to continue the equine 
metaphor) the horse we should ride. 
III. TRUTH, REPUTATION, AND OTHER HARMS 
Having documented the interference with free speech in-
terposed by trademark law, including in particular the trade-
mark dilution cause of action for “famous brands,” the solution 
Desai proposes is to import the public figure doctrine and “ac-
tual malice” standard from the Court’s decisions regarding 
First Amendment limits on state libel law into the corpo-
rate/trademark context.43 The advantages of this approach, he 
argues, are that it would limit speaker liability to situations 
where the defendant has made a “false statement about the 
company”44 and would permit most litigation to be resolved at 
an early stage, thereby limiting the chilling effects the threat of 
protracted litigation creates.45 Desai also points out that juxta-
posing the public figure doctrine with trademark dilution law 
exposes a fundamental tension between constitutional and in-
tellectual-property principles because dilution law is explicitly 
designed to protect corporate reputation, but it is a fundamen-
tal premise of First Amendment doctrine that public figures 
(whether corporate or individual) do not “own” their reputa-
tions.46 To the contrary, the very purpose of the First Amend-
ment is to enable “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” public 
 
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611 (PKC), 
2012 WL 1022247, at *16–20 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 43. See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 44. Desai, supra note 1, at 485. 
 45. Id. at 500–02. 
 46. Id. at 481–82. 
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debate “that . . . may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on” public figures.47 
Desai is clearly correct that requiring corporate public fig-
ures to prove falsehood and actual malice will substantially 
limit their ability to use trademark law to throttle critical 
speech.48 Moreover, his proposal has solid support in the Su-
preme Court’s own case law. Faced with a conflict between 
First Amendment protections for public debate and a liability 
theory other than libel—in particular, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (“IIED”)—the Court borrowed from New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan to protect the speech. Thus, in Hus-
tler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, the Court reversed an IIED ver-
dict against Hustler Magazine in favor of the minister Jerry 
Falwell based on Hustler’s publication of an “ad parody” sug-
gesting that Falwell’s “first time” was “a drunken incestuous 
rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.”49 The Court con-
cluded that imposing liability in this context threatened to si-
lence or chill substantial amounts of political speech, including 
“caustic” caricatures of public figures.50 As such, it concluded 
that, just as with libel and defamation, a public figure may not 
recover for IIED unless he or she can prove “that the publica-
tion contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘ac-
tual malice,’ i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false 
or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.”51 
More recently, in Snyder v. Phelps the Court again rejected an 
IIED claim based on “outrageous” speech (there, a vicious, ho-
mophobic protest held in the proximity of the funeral of a fallen 
soldier) because the speech was on “a matter of public con-
cern.”52 In so holding, the Court relied almost entirely on New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny (including Hustler) 
for the proposition that public debate must remain untram-
meled and robust,53 though it did not explicitly evoke the false-
hood and “actual malice” rules—presumably because factual 
falsehood was not really at issue in Snyder. 
There is thus good precedent for the extension of the “actu-
al malice” standard beyond the libel/defamation context. There 
 
 47. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 48. Desai, supra note 1, at 496–502. 
 49. 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988). 
 50. Id. at 54. 
 51. Id. at 56. 
 52. 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1213, 1215–16 (2011). 
 53. Id. at 1215–16, 1219. 
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are reasons, however, to question both this precedent and De-
sai’s specific extension of it into trademark dilution law. This is 
because the analogy between libel law on the one hand, and 
IIED and trademark dilution on the other, is imperfect. The es-
sence of the modern torts of libel and defamation is harm to 
reputation caused by the promulgation of factual falsehoods 
about an individual.54 It therefore made perfect sense for the 
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to place proof of false-
hood at the heart of its reconciliation of libel and free speech, 
and to further require proof of “actual malice”—i.e., mens rea—
in order to grant speech some needed “breathing space.”55 The 
IIED tort, however, is not designed to protect against loss of 
reputation; it is designed to protect against emotional harm, 
and conduct intentionally designed to impose such harm. There 
is, however, no particular connection between emotional harm 
and truth. Certainly falsehood can cause harm, but so can 
truth, and so in addition can exposition and opinion with no re-
lation to fact at all. Indeed, the Hustler Court even acknowl-
edged this argument,56 but then dismissed it with little or no 
explanation in the course of adopting the actual malice stand-
ard.57 The result of this holding is to leave public figures with 
no compensation for real, proven emotional injuries unless the 
plaintiff can prove “falsehood” and “actual malice”—showings 
with no causal relationship to the injury suffered. To be sure, 
the Court may well have been correct to deny liability in Hus-
tler (I think it was). The underlying question in Hustler was 
whether the First Amendment’s preference for robust public 
debate trumps a public figure’s legitimate request for compen-
sation.58 The correct answer may well be yes—as I mentioned, I 
think that it is—but the Court’s invocation of “actual malice” 
adds nothing to that debate because falsehood is completely or-
thogonal to the harm addressed by IIED.59 
 
 54. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (“The legitimate 
state interest underlying the law of libel is the compensation of individuals for 
the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood.”). 
 55. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (quoting NAACP 
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 56. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52–53 (1988). 
 57. Id. at 56. 
 58. See id. at 50 (describing the issue presented). 
 59. In Snyder v. Phelps, the Court did not invoke “actual malice,” but it 
similarly failed to address directly why the Phelps and society’s interest in 
open debate trumped Snyder’s completely reasonable demands for compensa-
tion for the emotional harm caused by the Phelps, other than through asser-
tion. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (stating summarily 
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The extension of the “actual malice” standard to trademark 
dilution law raises similar, though more complex, questions. 
Admittedly, dilution law, like libel law (but unlike IIED) is con-
cerned with reputation, making the analogy seemingly more 
apt. But there is a crucial difference between libel and dilution. 
As noted above, libel law focuses sharply on harm to reputation 
because of falsehood. The same is clearly not true of dilution 
law. In Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., the decision regard-
ing the song about the Barbie doll, the Ninth Circuit explicitly 
clarified that while trademark infringement suits turn on con-
sumer confusion (which is analogous to falsehood), trademark 
dilution claims do not.60 Indeed, in none of the cases Desai fo-
cuses on, including the two Barbie cases, the Deere deer case, 
the Hyundai case, and the Coke/cocaine case, was falsehood or 
consumer confusion a serious concern.61 No one, after all, was 
likely to believe that the Coca-Cola company was behind the 
Cocaine posters. Desai himself of course recognizes this point,62 
but then does not consider the implications of this fact for the 
“actual malice” standard. The problem, however, is basic. If 
falsehood is not a requirement of dilution, then requiring proof 
of falsehood and actual malice, as Desai proposes, does not 
merely create a First Amendment defense to dilution claims; it 
fundamentally alters the nature of the claim, effectively col-
lapsing it with trademark infringement claims or libel claims. 
Moreover, incorporation of “actual malice” into dilution law 
would not merely limit some dilution claims, it would in fact 
eviscerate the entire federal dilution statute. This is because 
under federal law, dilution claims are only available for “fa-
mous” marks—i.e. those that are “widely recognized by the 
general consuming public of the United States.”63 However, as 
Desai convincingly argues, the very same factors that make a 
mark famous effectively ensure that the owner of the mark 
would qualify as a “general-purpose public figure,” triggering 
the actual malice standard.64 This in turn means that the actu-
al malice standard will apply to all trademark dilution claims, 
thereby effectively converting all such claims into either 
trademark infringement or libel claims. The Federal Trade-
 
that the Constitution prohibits suppression of even such offensive speech).  
 60. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 61. See Desai, supra note 1, at 484–85, 500–01 (discussing these cases). 
 62. See id. at 483 (“[D]ilution does not require that the speech deceive or 
confuse consumers and never even asks whether it was false.”). 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
 64. Desai, supra note 1, at 483. 
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mark Dilution Act65 will have been effectively repealed. Per-
haps this is a good thing (more on this later), but if that is true 
it is better to say so rather than to achieve this objective by 
stealth. 
At this point, there is some value in taking a step back. I 
have argued that the incorporation of the First Amendment 
rules regarding libel into trademark dilution law may not be 
appropriate, because unlike libel, falsehood is not at the heart 
of, or even a general component of, dilution claims. At the same 
time, it is important to remember that the problem Desai has 
identified—the misuse of dilution law to silence critics of 
trademark holders—is a real and serious one. What then is the 
appropriate constitutional response to this dilemma? 
To answer this question, we need to take a closer look at 
dilution law. Federal law recognizes two distinct forms of 
trademark dilution: dilution by blurring, and dilution by 
tarnishment.66 Dilution by blurring is “association arising from 
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous 
mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”67 In 
other words, it occurs when a famous mark becomes associated 
with some product other than the original owner’s. Dilution by 
tarnishment, on the other hand, is “association arising from 
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark 
that harms the reputation of the famous mark.”68 Blurring 
claims do not strike me as generally raising serious First 
Amendment concerns, especially given the existence of the fair 
use and non-commercial use exclusions.69 After all, blurring is a 
form of economic free-riding on the investment into a famous 
mark’s reputation by the owner,70 an activity which does not 
contribute meaningfully to public debate. And the fact that 
there is no falsehood involved—that the diluter is not pretend-
ing to be the mark owner—does not really change that fact. It 
is true that some prohibitions of blurring will silence criticisms 
of corporations, but the effect seems unlikely to be large, and 
also seems fairly easily avoidable by the speaker. After all, crit-
 
 65. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). 
 66. See id. § 1125(c)(2) (providing definitions for these two types of dilu-
tion). 
 67. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
 68. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
 69. See id. § 1125(c)(3) (establishing these exemptions). 
 70. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 
2002) (noting that dilution by blurring whittles away the trademark’s value 
and dilutes selling power).  
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icism of the holder of a famous mark is hardly likely to lead 
viewers to associate the mark with the criticizer, absent unu-
sual circumstances. So, the First Amendment probably should 
not be understood, absent unusual circumstances, to bar most 
blurring claims. 
Tarnishment is an entirely different matter. Tarnishment 
claims are based on the supposition that owners of famous 
marks have a right to protect the reputations of their marks 
even from truthful criticism—because remember, if the criti-
cism is false, the mark owner would have a libel claim (subject 
to the actual malice standard), and so the tarnishment claim 
adds nothing. But this cannot be right. As Desai points out, it is 
a fundamental assumption of the First Amendment, and of 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan in particular, that public fig-
ures (which all owners of famous marks are) do not “own their 
reputations.”71 In other words, the policies underlying the dilu-
tion-by-tarnishment claim are in direct, irreconcilable conflict 
with the First Amendment. The solution, then, is not to convert 
a tarnishment claim into a libel claim by adding falsehood and 
actual-malice requirements, since libel law adequately encom-
passes such causes of action. The solution is to forthrightly rec-
ognize that the claim itself is unconstitutional, no less so than 
the law of seditious libel and the Sedition Act of 1798.72 In 
short, dilution-by-blurring claims are not inherently incon-
sistent with the First Amendment, but dilution-by-tarnishment 
claims are. 
CONCLUSION 
Deven Desai has done a great service by bringing to light 
the deep tension between trademark dilution law and the First 
Amendment. Too often, when intellectual property is at issue, 
courts simply brush off serious First Amendment problems,73 
and Desai is quite correct to condemn that flippant attitude. He 
also makes a powerful argument regarding the essentially po-
litical nature of much modern corporate speech, including ad-
vertising, as well as the fact that most major corporations, in-
 
 71. Desai, supra note 1, at 456. 
 72. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274–76 (1964) (explain-
ing that the Sedition Act was constitutionally invalid); Abrams v. United 
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Sedi-
tion Act as inconsistent with First Amendment principles). 
 73. Cf. Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 
186 (2003). 
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cluding all owners of famous marks, qualify as public figures 
for First Amendment purposes. I am thus convinced by almost 
all of his argument. The only objection I raise is that Desai does 
not go far enough, at least with respect to trademark dilution 
by tarnishment claims. Instead of trying to resurrect them in a 
new form, he should have simply buried them. 
 
